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Abstract
The member countries of the enlarged European Union show large
di¤erences in the structure of their tax systems. While consumption taxes
have been largely harmonized over the past decades, di¤erences remain in
taxes on factor incomes, in particular on capital income. Also, e¤ective
tax rates on capital income in Central and Eastern European countries
(CEEC) have been falling substantially over the last decade- a trend that
may suggest that some tax competition has taken place in the enlarged
European Union.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it presents and contrasts
e¤ective tax rates of Western European countries with those of the CEEC.
Second, from a theoretical aspect, it presents a model framework within
which a quantitative macroeconomic analysis of tax competition between
the two regions can be conducted. In addition the model suggests that
part of the large real exchange rate appreciation and current account
decits that CEE countries have experienced during the last decade might
be attributed to e¤ects from tax competition.
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1 Introduction
A central policy question that has arisen on the European Unions path towards
ever greater integration is the future of taxation within the Union. This is of
particular importance when contrasting the tax structure of the Central and
Eastern European countries (CEEC) that recently have joined or are negotiat-
ing to join the Union with those of the old member states, which shows some
signs of tax competition. The topic of taxation stands high on the agenda espe-
cially because, following the introduction of the EMU and the europeanization
of monetary policy, scal policy including taxation remains one of the few pol-
icy instruments left at the disposal of national authorities in their e¤ort to deal
with asymmetric shocks in their economies. In addition, through the introduc-
tion of the Stabillity and Growth pact, even scal policy has been constrained,
making taxation perhaps on of the nal policy instruments available with which
individual economies can inuence their economies.
Along with the increased interest in taxation issues arises the discussion
about whether tax competition should be considered as something harmful or
benecial. On the one hand it has been argued that the process of tax com-
petition should be observed with caution. Increased factor mobility within the
enlarged EU may put pressure on member states to lower their tax rates on
mobile factors in order to attract businesses. Therefore, uncontrolled compe-
tition may lead to a race to the bottom in which tax rates will fall so low
as to eradicate public revenues and to threaten countries abilities to supply
public goods. If tax competition is harmful then coordination of tax policy be-
tween national authorities is therefore welfare-improving. On the other hand,
advocates of tax competition consider it, claiming that it is a useful means for
achieving lower distortionary tax rates on factor incomes and therefore improves
the present ine¢ cient tax systems. If ine¢ ciently high taxes on factor incomes
can be reduced, the implied welfare gains may be large.
A look at the available data shows that in a number of countries may indeed
have involved in tax competition, that is, in a variety of countries in Central
and Eastern Europe e¤ective average tax rates on capital income have indeed
been falling signicantly over the last decade.
In order to address the issue of tax competition in the enlarged Union, the
paper proposes a standard two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model,
in which two national scal authorities set taxes on factor incomes and con-
sumption, following closely Mendoza (2003), Mendoza and Tesar (1995, 1998,
2003). The model is calibrated such that the two regions in the model can be
interpreted as Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. This model
framework is able to provide insights into the transmission mechanism of a tax
cut on capital income in the CEEC. It emphasizes three global externalities
that national tax policy of one country inicts on other countries and that can
lead to strategic behavior, and it allows to examine the transitional dynamics
on macro-variables in reponse to a change in tax policy.
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Mendoza (2002) and Mendoza and Tesar (2003) describe the three global
externalities of national tax policies as follows:
The rst is the relative-price externality : countries engaged in tax competi-
tion attempt to use tax policy so as to inuence the terms of trade or the world
real interest rate in their favor, leading to beggar-thy-neigbor e¤ects.
The second externality operates through a wealth-redistribution e¤ect. Strate-
gic cuts in taxes can be used to attract internationally mobile factors of pro-
duction. The payo¤s assigned to strategic cuts reect the welfare gains induced
by the cross-country relocation of mobile factors and its impact on the present
discounted value of national income and the long-run stocks of physical capital
and foreign nancial assets.
Finally, the scal solvency externality is a by-product of the rst two exter-
nalitites: as a result of tax competition which may lead to a race to the bottom
in which governments reduce taxes on mobile factors of production. This erodes
the tax base because (a) revenues from taxes on mobile factors decline on ac-
count of lower tax rates, (b) the ow of mobile factors of production from a
high-tax country to a low-tax country directly reduces the tax base in the high
tax country, and (c), in general equilibrium, the relocation of mobile factors can
also lower factor payments to immobile factors and overall factor income in the
high tax country, thus further eroding the tax base. As tax revenue falls, the
government is forced either to reduce expenditures or to raise taxes. If gov-
ernment outlays have utility or production benets, or if alternative taxes are
distortionary, this scal solvency externality reduces welfare.
The model also adopts a two sector structure, with a tradable and a non-
tradable sector in each region, in order to emphasize the role of the relative price
of non-tradables for real exchange rate appreciation that are a central feature
of CEE countries over the last decade. The model suggest that part of the large
observed appreciation may stem from e¤ects of tax competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on
the structure of the tax system in Western and Central and Eastern Europe,
together with some other noteworthy stylized facts for the CEEC. Section 3
introduces the model. Section 4 lays out in detail the transmission mechanism
of a cut in the tax rate on capital income in the CEEC and shows some impulse
responses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 E¤ective Tax Rates
To gain insights about the occurence and strength of tax competition between
di¤erent European regions it is useful to start out by inspecting and contrasting
the available data on tax rates.
3
Figure 1 plots the statutory tax rate on corporate income, which shows that
over the past decade rates have been falling in both Western European as well
as in CEE countries; a rst indicative sign of tax competition taking place. As
can be observed, the decline in the rates of the latter group has been much
more drastically. Statutory rates are, however, a very crude measure of the
tax burden and of the distortionary e¤ects of taxes on factor incomes, since
they do not take into account a number of relevant factors such as tax credits,
deductions, or exemptions that are present in any complex tax system.
More precise measures that do incorporate this kind of information in a man-
ner that captures the overall burden from each tax are given by the OECDs
implicit tax rates (ITR), published annually in a report on the Structures of
the taxation systems in the European Union(Eurostat, 2006, 2007). These tax
rates are backward-looking measures of average e¤ective tax rates (AETRs)1 ,
computed using publicly available OECD data of national accounts and revenue
statistics, and essentially follow the computation method of Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1994) including updates and revisions suggested by Carey and Tchilin-
gurian (2000).
Using this method time series of e¤ective tax rates on factor incomes -capital
and labor income- and consumption can be constructed. These three tax rates
are measured as ad-valorem estimates by classifying virtually all forms of tax
revenue at the government level in one of the three taxes. Each measure is then
expressed as a fraction of a precise estimate of the corresponding tax base. The
method, by suggesting the use of data on pre- and post-tax income and prices,
produces aggregate e¤ective tax rates that in fact correspond to realized average
tax rates in the macroeconomy and produce measures that are consistent with
the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium
framework, which will be important for the calibration of the theoretical model
in section 3. Appendix A provides further details on the construction of the
AETR measures.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of implicit tax rates on consumption, labor and
capital income respectively, for the group of Western European countries (WE)
and the group of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). WE consists
of the four largest economies, namely France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom. The CEEC group consists of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic2 . The tax rates of both groups are
computed as simple arithmetric means of their respective group members.
1E¤ective tax rates can be distinguished in essentially two ways. A rst distinction is
made between backward- and forward-looking rates; the rst category is backward-looking
in the sense that the tax liability ratio on a particular factor is divided by a measure of the
value-added generated by this factor in the past. Forward looking measures are suited for
measuring the future tax burden that a corporation will have to bear. These measures assess
corporate taxes as a percentage of the pre-tax prot of a prospective - hence forward-looking
- investment project (Leibrecht and Roemisch (2002).
A second distinction can be made between average and marginal e¤ective rates.
2The choice of these countries for the CEEC group is based primarily on the availability of
the measure for e¤ective tax rates on capital income. Due to incomplete data, or redenitions
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Figure 2 shows that indirect taxes have already been largely harmonized
among the two blocs -consumption tax rates are very similar and basically con-
stant over the last decade. Di¤erences in e¤ective tax rates on labor income
are somewhat more pronounced. However, e¤ective tax rates on this factor are
also broadly similar, and do not suggest major policy changes over time. The
last panel of gure 2 plots the time path of capital income taxes in both re-
gions. While the capital income tax in WE has remained largely at the same
level (to be precise, it actually has increased by 2.5 percentage points over the
1995-2005 period), the capital income tax rate in the CEEC has dropped -by
the year 2005- by 8.4 percentage points relative to its 1995 level. For the inter-
ested reader, Figure 5 and Table 2-4 provide more detailed -country by country-
information on e¤ective tax rates on consumption, labor and capital income.
2.2 Real Exchange Rate Appreciation
Figure 6 shows the real e¤ective exchange rate of a number of Central and
Eastern European transition countries. It documents a large real exchange rate
appreciation in essentially all countries, independent of the specic exchange
rate regimes that those countries had chosen3 .
An explanation for this phenomenon that features prominently in the litera-
ture on accession countries attributes a large part of the observed real exchange
rate appreciation to movements in the relative prices (across countries) of the
non-tradable sector relative to the tradable sector, that are brought about by
productivity di¤erentials in the two sectors - that is, to the Balassa-Samuelson
e¤ect. The model of this paper presents a two country model with a tradable
and a non-tradable sector in each economy, thereby also leaving room for the
role of the relative price of non-tradables as an explanation for exchange rate
movements. Within this framework it will be shown that part of the increase in
the price of non-tradable goods in the CEECs and therefore part of the CEECs
real exchange rate appreciations, might be attributed not to Balassa-Samuelson
like e¤ects from productivity di¤erences, but to di¤erences in the regionsscal
policies, in particular, to the CEECs choice of lowering the capital income tax
rate.
of collected data, e¤ective tax rates on capital income are not available for Hungary and
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.
3Some authors argue that an initial real undervaluation at the time when those countries
gave up the command economy and at the beginning of the transition period can account
for part of the real appreciation in the rst half of the 1990 (Halpern and Wyplosz (1997),
Krajnyák and Zettelmeyer (1998), Begg et al. (1999)).
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2.3 Current Account Decits
Another feature that essentially all CEE transition economies share is their
heavy external borrowing on nancial markets. Figure 7 shows the time paths
of the current account decits over the last decade. While this is in line with
predictions from standard economic theory for transition countries -the borrow
in order to build up their long-run capital stock-, the model suggests that part
of the external borrowing occurs because the capital stock has to be built up in
response to changes in tax policy in CEEC.
3 The Model
This section presents a two country neoclassical model augmented to allow for
a quantitative analysis of taxation policies and follows closely the framework
proposed by Mendoza and Tesar (1995). The domestic country can be thought
of as the economic region of Central and Eastern European countries, while the
foreign economy is understood to represent Western Europe. Two national scal
authorities set taxes on labor income, capital income and on consumption. The
model is able to capture three international externalities of national tax policy
simultaneously in a fully dynamic general equilibrium model: the relative price
externality, the wealth-redistribution e¤ect and the scal solvency externality.
Because the development of the real exchange rate and the role of the relative
price of non-tradables is held important for the experience of the CEEC over
the last decade, I model the two economic regions as consisting of a tradable
and a non-tradable sector each.
3.1 Households
Households in the domestic economy maximize lifetime utility over consumption
of traded and nontraded goods (cN;t and cT;t) and leisure (Lt) subject to a
lifetime budget constraint. Foreign households, whose variables are denoted
with asterisks, face a similar problem. e is the e¤ective discount factor, which
is equal to e =  (1 + )1 , where  is the subjective discount factor and the
term (1 + )1  is needed to consider a stationary system along a balanced
growth path. Households lifetime discounted utility is thus:
E0
1X
t=0
etu (cT;t; cN;t; Lt) (1)
where the instantaneous utility function is given by:
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
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 1

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 1
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(2)
The budget constraint is given by:
(1 +  c) [cT;t + ptcN;t] + (1 + ) [kT;t+1 + ptkN;t+1 + qtbt+1] = (3)
(1   l) [wT;tlT;t + ptwN;tlN;t] + (1  k) [(rT;t   ) kT;t + pt (rN;t   ) kN;t] +
+kT;t + ptkN;t + bt + et + TT;t + ptTN;t   T (kT;t; xT;t)  ptN (kN;t; xN;t)
where pt is the price of nontraded goods in terms of traded goods (the
traded good is the numeraire). Let us dene the sectoral index i = T;N . Each
country taxes a mobile factor of production (physical capital), ki;t, an immobile
factor (labor), li;t and consumption, ci;t, using time-invariant tax rates. The tax
rates on consumption, labor and capital are denoted  c,  l, and k respectively.
Countries trade one-period risk free bond, bt, under perfect mobility of nancial
capital. This allows physical capital to relocate across countries even though
ownership of shares of each countrys capital stock are not directly traded. The
international mobility of physical capital is less than perfect, however, because
capital adjustment costs limit the pace at which capital ows across countries,
given by expressions i (ki; xi) =

2

xii
ki
  zi

. Parameter zi is the long-run
investment-capital ratio, such that at steady state capital adjustment costs are
zero.
The model also features public debt markets so that scal authorities do not
need to balance the primary decit each period, but instead equate the present
value of tax revenues with the present value of a predetermined, time-invariant
amount of government outlays. Thus, if one country undertakes a tax reform,
the scal solvency externality imposes endogeneous tax adjustments but with
the exibility to use public debt as a means to smooth the tax burden over time.
Implicit in eq. (3) is the assumption that the capital income tax is based on
the residence principle and the tax code provides for a depreciation allowance.
Also implicit is the assumption that bond payments are tax-free.
Net investment, xi;t, is given by:
xT;t = (1 + ) kT;t+1   (1  ) kT;t (4)
xN;t = (1 + ) kN;t+1   (1  ) kN;t (5)
The household maximization problem therfore consists of maximizing (1)
anf (2) with respect to eq. (3)-(5).
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3.2 Firms
Firms and maximize prots subject to costs, taking pre-factor prices as given.
They produce under conditions of perfect competition with a constant returns
to scale production technology. Firms in each sector i, i = T;N , maximize:
ki;tl
1 
i;t   wi;tli;t   ri;tki;t
3.3 Public Sector
The date-t budget constraint on government purchases in the tradable and non-
tradable sector, gT and gN , is given by:
gT;t + ptgN;t + TT;t + ptTN;t = k [(rT;t   ) kT;t + pt (rN;t   ) kN;t] + (6)
+ l [wT;tlT;t + ptwN;tlN;t] +  c [cT;t + ptcN;t]
Public debt is not explicitly modelled, but scal policy is described in terms
of the incomes from distortionary tax rates, a rule for government expendi-
tures and exogenous, time-invariant levels of of transfer funding social programs
(TT ; TN ) which in principle can be either lump-sum taxes or subsidies. Total tax
revenue -the right hand side of eq. (6)- is derived from taxes on factor incomes,
wage income and return on capital, and from consumption taxes.
3.4 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions in the goods and in the bonds market are:
kT;tl
1 
T;t + k

T;tl
1 
T;t = (7)
= cT;t + c

T;t + xT;t + x

T;t + gT;t + g

T;t +T (kT;t; xT;t) + T
 
kT;t; x

T;t

kN;tl
1 
N;t = cN;t + xN;t + gN;t +N (kN;t; xN;t) (8)
kN;tl
1 
N;t = c

N;t + x

N;t + g

N;t +N
 
kN;t; x

N;t

(9)
The full set of the models equilibrium conditions are standard and are listed
in Appendix B. The real exchange rate is given by the price of the foreign
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consumption basket in relative to the price of the domestic consumption basket,
such that a decrease in rer means a domestic real appreciation:
rert =

! + (1  !) p1 t

! + (1  !) p1 t
 (10)
The current account is dened as the change in the net foreign asset position,
expressed as a ratio of GDP:
cat =
bt+1   bt
yT;t + ptyN;t
(11)
3.5 Calibration and Model Solution
The model is calibrated to reect broad features of the data for the two blocs
analyzed. The home countrys parameters are chosen to reect an aggregate of
the CEEC bloc (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the
Slovak Republic), and the foreign country is calibrated to data for an aggre-
gate of Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom).
It is noteworthy that the all preference and technology parameters are as-
sumed to be identical across the two regions. In particular, in both the domestic
and the foreign country, the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , equals 2, which im-
plies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one-half, a common choice
in macro models. The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradable
and non-tradable goods  is equal to 0:44, as estimated by Stockman and Tesar
(1995), and the weight of non-tradables in overall consumption is ! = 0:5. Pa-
rameters a and a are set such that the steady state labor supply corresponds
to 20 percent of agentstime. Technology parameters are as follows: Parameter
, which reects labors share in GDP is taken to be 0.64 in both the tradable
and the non-tradable sector. Capital depreciates at rate  = 0:025 per quarter.
Since it is not the focus of this paper, productivity is not explicitly modeled.
For the purpose of the the experiment, the model is calibrated such that
the two regions di¤er only in terms of scal policy parameters, that is, in the
time-invariant tax rates both regions choose for consumption, labor and capital
income ( c;  l and k, and c ; 

l and 

k), and in the amount of government
expenditure and transfers (gi;t; Ti;t and gi;t; T

i;t). The tax rates are calibrated
to an the 1995 value of the average of the region members, which, for the CEEC
are  c = 0:21,  l = 0:38 and k = 0:24, and for WE are c = 0:19, 

l = 0:41
and k = 0:27. Table 5 summarizes the parameterization of the model.
In order to solve the model, the system of equations is log-linearized around
the non-stochastic steady state. The resulting system of linear di¤erence equa-
tions can then be solved with any of the many readily available algorithms (e.g.,
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Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Uhlig (1995), Klein (2000). While this solution
techniques is very standard, in the context of this paper it deserves special atten-
tion. In particular, since the solution technique consists of a local approximation
around the non-stochastic steady state, it might not be completely innocuous in
the context of a calibration to CEE countries. It can of course be argued that
the CEEC are still on their transition paths after they gave up the command
economy, approaching the long-run steady state as they build up their capital
stocks. While this could easily be captured in the framework of the model -by
letting the CEEC economy start o¤ from a level of the capital stock lower than
the long-run steady state level implied by the above parameterization- this will
not be done in the following sections, in order to be able to isolate the e¤ects
of a change in tax policy from the e¤ects of capital deepening.
4 Transmission Mechanism of Tax Competition
Figures 8-10 document the transmission mechanism of a cut in the domestic tax
rate on capital income. The tax cut (one time and permanent) is taken to be 8
percentage points, similar to the size of the drop observed for the CEEC capital
income tax rate over the period 1995-2005. Model impulse responses are shown
for the three externalities of CEEC tax policy on WE, that is, the relative-price
externality, the wealth-redistribution e¤ect, and the scal-solvency externality.
In addition, gure 11 shows the transitional dynamics of macroeconomic ag-
gregates in response to the tax cut, consumption, labor supply, and output,
together with the paths of the real exchange rate and the current account.
The three global externalities that the literature of international tax competi-
tion generally emphasize are, following largely the line of exposition of Mendoza
(2003) and Mendoza and Tesar (2003):
-) The traditional market-power or beggar-thy-neighbor e¤ect on relative
prices: countries engaged in tax competition attempt to use tax policy so as to
inuence the terms of trade or the world real interest rate in their favor.
-) The wealth redistribution e¤ect: national tax policy inicts a wealth-
redistribution e¤ect. Strategic cuts in taxes can be used to attract internation-
ally mobile factors of production. The payo¤s assigned to strategic cuts reect
the welfare gains induced by the cross-country relocation of mobile factors and
its impact on the present discounted value of national income and the long-run
stocks of physical capital and foreign nancial assets.
-) The scal solvency externality or tax-revenue-erosion externality, which
is triggered by the adverse e¤ect of tax competition on tax revenue, and is a
by-product of the relative-price and wealth-redistribution externalities. If tax
competition may lead to a race to the bottomin which governments reduce
taxes on mobile factors of production, this erodes the tax base because (a)
revenues from taxes on mobile factors decline on account of lower tax rates4 ,
4Assuming these tax rates are in the upward-sloping region of their La¤er curves.
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(b) the ow of mobile factors of production from a high-tax country to a low-tax
country directly reduces the tax base in the high tax country, and (c), in general
equilibrium, the relocation of mobile factors can also lower factor payments to
immobile factors and overall factor income in the high tax country, thus further
eroding the tax base. As tax revenue falls, the government is forced either to
reduce expenditures or to raise taxes. If government outlays have utility or
production benets, or if alternative taxes are distortionary, this scal solvency
externality reduces welfare.
Figure 8 plots the responses of factor incomes and the world interest rate
and therefore captures the relative-price externality. Because of arbitrage of
after-tax real returns to physical capital through cross-country trade in the one-
period international bond, the after-tax returns on capital have to be equalized
across countries. Following the capital tax cut in the domestic economy, after-
tax return on capital increases in the domestic country relative to the foreign
country, leading to an inow of capital into the domestic economy (CEEC). Even
though the interest rate increase is only temporary it triggers large reallocations
of capital across regions. While in a closed economy framework this transition
period to build up the domestic economys higher implied capital stock may be
very costly (since consumption needs to be temporarily lowered and labor e¤ort
increased), in a world with open capital markets, the ability to borrow from
abroad reduces the transition costs and shifts some of the burden of adjust-
ment to the other country, that is, to WE. As shown in gure 8, the increased
borrowing by the domestic economy puts pressure on the world interest rate to
increase, as long as the returns on capital are not equalized.
Figure 9 summarizes the e¤ects of the wealth redistribution channel in re-
sponse to the CEEC capital tax rate cut. As can be seen, the capital stock in
the CEEC increases in both the tradable and the non-tradable sector, CEECs
bond holdings are negative; they borrow from abroad in order to nance the
building up their capital stock.
The scal externality is depicted in gure 10. Because of the reallocation
of capital from WE to CEEC and therefore the erosion of the tax base in WE,
their tax revenues drop. If WE were to keep tax revenues constant, it would
therefore need to raise either taxes on consumption or taxes on labor income.
While, on welfare grounds, raising taxes on consumption would seem preferable
relative to raising distortionary taxes on labor, that option seems implausible
given the e¤orts to harmonize indirect taxes in the European Union in the past
decades.
Finally, gure 11, plots the transition paths for consumption, labor supply
and output, in response to the CEEC tax cut. The gradual increase in the capi-
tal stock leads to an increase in output in the long run. In addition, the increase
in output is driven by increases in labor supply, steming from an equalization of
marginal products of labor with the marginal product of capital. The increases
in output translate into a higher long run level in consumption. Consumption
abroad also increases in the long run, largely because of the income from the
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external debt the CEEC have accumulated. The real exchange rate is appreci-
ated and the current account is in decit for a long part of the transition path,
suggesting that part of the experience documented in sections 2.2 and 2.3 might
be attributed to e¤ects from tax competition.
5 Conclusions
This paper has documented di¤erences in the tax structure of Western Euro-
pean countries and that of the Central and Eastern European Countries of the
enlarged European Union. E¤ective tax rates on capital income have markedly
fallen in a number of CEE countries. This drop in the capital income tax is
modeled in a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model to study the ex-
ternalities the tax cut imposes and its transmission on WE. The impact of these
externalities on WE comes in terms of a temporary increase in the world inter-
est rate, a large outow of capital from high-tax WE to low-tax CEEC, and -if
WE wants to maintain the same level of government expenditure- an undesired
increase in the WE labor or consumption tax needed to preserve scal solvency.
In addition, the transitional dynamics of the CEECs tax cut, contribute to ex-
plaining part of the observed large real exchange rate appreciation and current
account decits in the CEE countries in the last one and half decades.
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Appendix A
Tax rate calculations using data from OECD datasets according to the formulas
from Mendoza et al. (1994).
Consumption: C=
5110+5121
C+G GW 5110 5121
Income:  I=
1100
OSPUE+PEI+W
Labor: L=
IW+2000+3000
W+2200
Capital: K=
I(OSPUE+PEI)+1200+4100+4400
OS
Data from OECD Revenue Statistics
1 1 0 0  Ta x e s o n in c om e , p r o t s a n d c a p i t a l g a in s o f in d iv id u a l s
1 2 0 0  Ta x e s o n in c om e , p r o t s a n d c a p i t a l g a in s o f c o r p o r a t io n s
2 0 0 0  S o c ia l S e c u r i ty c o n t r ib u t io n s
2 2 0 0  S o c ia l S e c u r i ty c o n t r ib u t io n s o f em p loy e r s
3 0 0 0  Ta x e s o n p ay r o l l a n d w o rk fo r c e
4 1 0 0  R e c u r r e n t t a x e s o n im m ova b le p r o p e r ty
4 4 0 0  Ta x e s o n n a n c ia l a n d c a p i t a l t r a n s a c t io n s
5 1 1 0  G en e r a l t a x e s o n g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s
5 1 2 1  E x c i s e t a x e s
Data from OECD National Accounts, Volume II
C  P r iva t e n a l c o n s um p t io n e x p e n d i t u r e ( 1 .2 + 1 .3 )
1 .2  H o u s e h o ld n a l c o n s um p t io n e x p e n d i t u r e s f r om G D P : e x p e n d i t u r e a p p r o a ch t a b le
1 .3  F in a l c o n s um p t io n e x p e n d i t u r e o f N P IS H s f r om s am e t a b le
G  G ov e rnm e n t n a l c o n s um p t io n e x p e n d i t u r e ( 1 .4 )
1 .4  G ov e rnm e n t n a l c o n s um p t io n e x p e n d i t u r e f r om s am e t a b le
G W  C om p e n s a t io n o f em p loy e e s p a id b y p r o d u c e r s o f g ov e r nm e n t s e r v i c e s ( 1 2 .1 1 )
1 2 .1 1  C om p e n s a t io n o f em p loy e e s , p ay a b le f r om G en e r a t io n o f in c om e a c c o u n t
o f s im p l ie d g e n e r a l g ov e r nm e n t a c c o u n t s
O S P U E  O p e r a t in g s u r p lu s o f p r iva t e u n in c o r p o r a t e d e n t e r p r i s e s ( 1 3 .5  1 3 .2 0 )
1 3 .5  G ro s s o p e r a t in g s u rp lu s a n d m ix e d in c om e f r om G en e r a t io n o f in c om e a c c o u n t
o f S im p l ie d a c c o u n t s f o r h o u s e h o ld s a n d N P IS H
1 3 .2 0  C o n sum p t io n o f x e d c a p i t a l f r om C a p i t a l a c c o u n t o f S im p l ie d a c c o u n t s
f o r h o u s e h o ld s a n d N P IS H
P E I  H o u s e h o ld p r o p e r ty a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r ia l in c om e ( 1 3 .8  1 3 .9 )
1 3 .8  P ro p e r ty in c om e , r e c e iva b le f r om D is t r ib u t io n o f in c om e a c c o u n t
o f S im p l ie d a c c o u n t s f o r h o u s e h o ld s a n d N P IS H
1 3 .9  P ro p e r ty in c om e , p ay a b le f r om D is t r ib u t io n o f in c om e a c c o u n t
o f S im p l ie d a c c o u n t s f o r h o u s e h o ld s a n d N P IS H
W  Wag e s a n d s a la r i e s ( 3 .8 )
3 .8  Wa g e s a n d s a la r i e s f r om G D P : in c om e a p p r o a ch t a b le
O S  O p e r a t in g s u rp lu s o f t h e e c o n om y ( 3 .1 5  4 .6 )
3 .1 5  G ro s s o p e r a t in g s u rp lu s a n d m ix e d in c om e f r om G D P : in c om e a p p r o a ch t a b le
4 .6  C o n sum p t io n o f x e d c a p i t a l f r om D is p o s a b le in c om e t a b le
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Appendix B
Optimality Conditions
Households:
ucT ;t = t (1 +  c) (12)
ucN ;t = t (1 +  c) pt (13)
ulT ;t = twT;t (1   l) (14)
ulN ;t = twN;t (1   l) pt (15)
t

(1 + )

1 + 

xT;t
kT;t
  zT

= (16)
eEt(t+1 "1 + (rT;t+1   ) (1  k) + xT;t+1
kT;t+1
  zT

1   + xT;t+1
kT;t+1

  
2

xT;t
kT;t
  zT
2#)
tpt

(1 + )

1 + 

xN;t
kN;t
  zN

= (17)
eEt(t+1pt+1 "1 + (rT;t+1   ) (1  k) + xT;t+1
kT;t+1
  zT

1   + xT;t+1
kT;t+1

  
2

xT;t
kT;t
  zT
2#)
t (1 + ) qt = eEt ft+1pt+1g (18)
(1 +  c) [cT;t + ptcN;t] + (1 + ) [kT;t+1 + ptkN;t+1 + qtbt+1] = (19)
(1   l) [wT;tlT;t + ptwN;tlN;t] + (1  k) [(rT;t   ) kT;t + pt (rN;t   ) kN;t] +
+kT;t + ptkN;t + bt + et + TT;t + ptTN;t   T (kT;t; xT;t)  ptN (kN;t; xN;t)
xT;t = (1 + ) kT;t+1   (1  ) kT;t (20)
xN;t = (1 + ) kN;t+1   (1  ) kN;t (21)
lT;t + lN;t + Lt = 1 (22)
Firms
wT;t = (1  ) kT;tl T;t (23)
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wN;t = (1  ) kN;tl N;t (24)
rT;t = k
 1
T;t l
1 
T;t (25)
rN;t = k
 1
N;t l
1 
N;t (26)
Public Sector
t = k [(rT;t   ) kT;t + pt (rN;t   ) kN;t]+ l [wT;tlT;t + ptwN;tlN;t]+ c [cT;t + ptcN;t]
(27)
Resource Constraints
kT;tl
1 
T;t +k

T;tl
1 
T;t = cT;t+c

T;t+xT;t+x

T;t+gT;t+g

T;t+T (kT;t; xT;t)+T
 
kT;t; x

T;t

(28)
kN;tl
1 
N;t = cN;t + xN;t + gN;t +N (kN;t; xN;t) (29)
kN;tl
1 
N;t = c

N;t + x

N;t + g

N;t +N
 
kN;t; x

N;t

(30)
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TABLES
Table 1: Adjusted top statutory tax rate on corporate income
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Central and Eastern European Countries
BG 40 40 40.2 37 34.3 32.5 28 23.5 23.5 20 15 15 10
CZ 41 39 39 35 35 31 31 31 31 28 26 24 24
EE 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 24 23 22
LV 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 22 19 15 15 15 15
LT 29 29 29 29 29 24 24 15 15 15 15 19 18
HU 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 17.6 17.5 17.5 18.6
PL 40 40 38 36 34 30 28 28 27 19 19 19 19
RO 38 38 38 38 38 25 25 25 25 25 16 16 16
SI 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 23
SK 40 40 40 40 40 29 29 25 25 19 19 19 19
Western European Countries
BE 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 40.2 34 34 34 34 34
DK 34 34 34 34 32 32 30 30 30 30 28 28 28
DE 56.8 56.7 56.7 56 51.6 51.6 38.3 38.3 39.6 38.3 38.7 38.7 38.7
IE 40 38 36 32 28 24 20 16 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
EL 40 40 40 40 40 40 37.5 35 35 35 32 29 25
ES 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 32.5
FR 36.7 36.7 41.7 41.7 40 37.8 36.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35 34.4 34.4
IT 52.2 53.2 53.2 41.3 41.3 41.3 40.3 40.3 38.3 37.3 37.3 37.3 37.3
LU 40.9 40.9 39.3 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 30.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 29.6 29.6
NL 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 34.5 34.5 34.5 31.5 29.6 25.5
AT 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 25 25 25
PT 39.6 39.6 39.6 37.4 37.4 35.2 35.2 33 33 27.5 27.5 27.5 26.5
FI 25 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 29 26 26 26
SE 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
UK 33 33 31 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
S o u r c e : E u r o s t a t , 2 0 0 7
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Table 2: Average e¤ective tax rate on consumption
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Central and Eastern European Countries
BG - - - - - 19.7 18.9 19.1 21.1 23.7 24.6
CZ 22.1 21.2 19.4 18.6 19.7 19.4 18.9 19.3 19.6 22 22.1
EE 20.6 19.2 20.7 18.4 18 19.7 19.4 20 20.4 20.5 23.8
LV 19.3 17.9 18.8 21.1 19.5 18.7 17.5 17.4 18.6 18.5 20.4
LT 17.7 16.4 20.4 20.7 19.2 17.8 17.4 17.8 17 16 16.5
HU 30.9 29.7 27.2 27.6 27.9 27.5 25.7 25.4 26 27.7 26.5
PL 21.3 21.2 20.1 19.1 19.7 18 17.4 18 18.5 18.7 19.8
RO - - - - - - 14.4 16.4 18.3 16.8 18.5
SI 25.1 24.7 23.4 24.9 25.8 24.1 23.7 24.9 24.9 24.8 24.5
SK 27.1 26 25.4 23.1 22.2 21.8 18.8 19.9 19.4 21.5 21.9
Western European Countries
BE 20.6 21.3 21.6 21.4 22.5 21.8 21 21.3 21.3 22 22.2
DK 30.5 31.6 31.9 32.7 33.7 33.4 33.5 33.7 33.3 33.3 33.7
DE 18.8 18.3 18.1 18.3 19 18.9 18.5 18.5 18.7 18.2 18.1
IE 24.9 24.8 25.4 25.7 26.1 26.4 24.5 25.5 25.3 26.5 27.2
EL 17.6 17.7 17.8 18.1 18.7 19 19.5 18.8 17.9 17.6 17
ES 14.6 14.7 15 15.7 16.3 15.7 15.3 15.5 16 16.1 16.3
FR 21.5 22.1 22.2 22 22.1 20.9 20.3 20.3 20 20.2 20.2
IT 17.4 17.1 17.3 17.8 18 17.9 17.3 17.1 16.6 16.9 16.9
LU 21.1 20.8 21.6 21.6 22.4 23.1 22.7 23 23.4 24.7 24.3
NL 23.2 23.3 23.8 23.4 23.9 23.7 24.4 23.8 24.2 24.9 25.4
AT 20.3 20.7 21.7 21.8 22.2 21.3 21.4 21.9 21.5 21.5 21.3
PT 19.1 19.5 19.3 19.9 20 19.2 19.3 19.9 19.8 20 -
FI 27.6 27.4 29.3 29.1 29.4 28.6 27.6 27.7 28.1 27.7 27.6
SE 27.9 27.2 26.9 27.4 27.2 26.5 26.9 27.4 27.5 27.6 28.1
UK 20.1 19.8 20 19.7 19.9 19.4 19 18.9 19.2 19.1 18.7
S o u r c e : E u r o s t a t , 2 0 0 7
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Table 3: Average e¤ective tax rate on labor
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Central and Eastern European Countries
BG - - - - - 38.8 34.4 33 35.5 36.3 34.2
CZ 40.5 39.5 40.3 40.7 40.5 40.7 40.3 41.2 41.4 41.7 41.3
EE 39.2 39.1 38.5 39.8 39.5 37.8 37.3 37.8 36.5 35.2 33.1
LV 39.2 34.6 36.1 37.2 37 36.7 36.5 37.8 36.6 36.7 36.2
LT 34.5 35 38.4 38.3 38.7 41.2 40.3 38.1 36.9 36 35.9
HU 42.6 43 43.7 42.8 42.7 42 42.3 42.1 40.6 39.9 40.5
PL 35.9 35.3 35 34.7 36 36.1 35.6 35.2 34.7 34.7 35.5
RO - - - - - - - 31.5 29.7 28.1 26.7
SI 38.9 37.1 37.3 37.7 38.4 37.7 37.7 37.8 38.4 38.1 38.5
SK 39.5 40 39.4 40.7 40 38.7 39.1 38.8 38 35.7 33.7
Western European Countries
BE 43.8 43.4 43.9 44.3 43.6 43.9 43.6 43.7 42.8 43 42.8
DK 40.1 40.2 40.6 38.8 40.1 40.9 40.7 38.8 38 37.4 37.3
DE 39.4 39.6 40.6 40.6 40.4 40.7 40.5 40.4 40.3 39.1 38.7
IE 29.7 29.3 29.5 28.6 28.7 28.5 27.4 25.9 25.2 26.1 25.6
EL 34.1 35.7 36.4 37.5 37 38.2 37.7 40 41.2 37.9 38
ES 28.9 29.3 28.5 28.2 27.7 28.1 29 29.3 29.4 29.3 30.1
FR 41.2 41.5 41.8 42.3 42.6 42.1 41.7 41.2 41.5 41.4 42.1
IT 37.8 41.5 43.2 44.6 43.7 43.2 43.4 43.3 43.3 43.1 43.1
LU 29.3 29.6 29.3 28.8 29.6 29.9 29.5 28.2 28.9 29 29.5
NL 34.4 33.3 32.5 32.9 33.6 34.3 30.3 30.4 30.8 30.6 30.7
AT 38.7 39.5 40.8 40.5 40.6 40.2 40.7 40.8 40.9 40.9 40.9
PT 28.1 28.3 28.5 28.4 26.5 27 27.4 27.6 29.5 29.5 -
FI 44.3 45.3 43.6 43.8 43.4 44.1 44.4 43.8 42.5 42 42
SE 48.4 49.7 50 51 50.5 49.2 47.9 46.6 46.4 46.4 46.4
UK 25.8 24.8 24.4 25 25.1 25.3 25 24.1 24.3 24.9 25.5
S o u r c e : E u r o s t a t , 2 0 0 7
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Table 4: Average e¤ective tax rate on capital
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Central and Eastern European Countries
BG - - - - - 11.4 13.2 - - - -
CZ 26.4 22.3 24 20.3 21.3 20.9 22.3 23.8 24.7 25.4 23.2
EE 24.7 15.6 17.7 18.2 15.8 6 5 6.4 8.5 8.9 8.1
LV - - - - 19 11.2 11.5 9.3 7.8 7.8 -
LT 15.1 15.4 15.6 16.2 15.5 10.6 8.1 7.5 9.2 10.8 11.4
HU - - - - - - - - - - -
PL 21.5 22 22.4 21 22.6 21.3 21.6 23.8 20.7 20.7 22.2
RO - - - - - - - - - - -
SI - - - - - - - - - - -
SK 33.5 30.1 24.9 24 22.1 19.5 17.1 17.4 16.8 16 14.4
Western European Countries
BE 25.3 26.7 27.9 30 31 29.3 29.4 30.7 33.2 33.9 34.5
DK 30 31 31.9 38.9 38.8 36.2 31 30.8 36.9 46.2 46.5
DE 22.4 25.6 24.5 25.9 29.1 29.2 22.7 21.2 21.5 21.9 23.3
IE 25.9 29.2 27.9 27.1 34.1 32.3 33.6 33 34.6 39.1 41.4
EL 11.8 11.6 13.5 16 18.2 20.3 17.4 17.3 15.8 15.4 -
ES 20.3 20.7 23.4 24.4 27.5 30.5 28.9 30.6 31 33.5 36
FR 31.2 34.4 35.2 35.2 38 37.5 38 36.7 35.4 36.9 38.9
IT 25.9 26.2 29.5 27 30.1 29.3 28.8 28.8 31.1 29.5 29
LU - - - - - - - - - - -
NL 21.2 23.2 22.2 22.6 23 20.5 23 25.2 22.3 22.1 21.2
AT 25.6 28 28.4 28.8 27 26 33 27.9 25.6 25.5 23.1
PT 18.8 21.1 23.3 24 27.2 32.4 30 31.4 32.6 - -
FI 28.5 30.9 31.5 32.6 32.2 36.4 25.7 27.4 25.8 26.1 26.7
SE 17.5 23.3 25.7 27.1 32.6 40 31.3 33.1 - - -
UK 33.3 32.3 34.3 35.7 39.8 40.8 42 37.6 33.7 35.3 37.6
S o u r c e : E u r o s t a t , 2 0 0 7
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Table 5: Baseline parameters values
Growth rate of output (T and NT)  0:007
Discount factor  0:99
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  2
Elasticity of subst. betw. T and N  0:44
Weight of T in overall cons. ! 0:5
Labors share in production (T & N)  0:64
Depreciation rate  0:025
Fiscal policy parameters
AETR on consumption, CEEC/ WE C ; C 0:21; 0:19
AETR on labor, CEEC/ WE N ; N 0:38; 0:41
AETR on consumption, CEEC/ WE K ; K 0:24; 0:27
Government expenditure shares GY ;
G
Y  0:20; 0:20
Implied big ratios
Consumption-Output ratio CY ;
C
Y  0:56; 0:56
Investment-Output ratio IY ;
I
Y  0:24; 0:24
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Adjusted top statutory tax rate on corporate income
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Figure 2: Average e¤ective tax rate on consumption, labor and capital
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Figure 5: Average e¤ective tax rates on consumption, labor and capital, all
countries
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Figure 6: Real e¤ective exchange rates, CEEC
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Figure 7: Current accounts, CEEC
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Figure 8: Model Impulse Responses to a one-time permanent cut in the
CEEC tax rate on capital, the relative-price channel:
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Figure 9: Model Impulse Responses to a one-time permanent cut in the
CEEC tax rate on capital, the wealth-redistribution channel:
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Figure 10: Model Impulse Responses to a one-time permanent cut in the
CEEC tax rate on capital, the tax-revenue-erosion externality
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Figure 11: Model Impulse Responses to a one-time permanent cut in the
CEEC tax rate on capital, Macroeconomic Dynamics in CEEC and WE:
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